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Abstract
We describe a general model, `experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) learning, which
includes reinforcement learning and a class of weighted ctitious play belief models as
special cases. In EWA, strategies have attractions which reect prior predispositions,
are updated based on payo experience, and determine choice probabilities according to
some rule (e.g., logit). A key feature is a parameter  which weights the strength of
hypothetical reinforcement of strategies which were not chosen according to the payo
they would have yielded. When  = 0 choice reinforcement results. When  = 1, levels of
reinforcement of strategies are proportional to expected payos given beliefs based on past
history. Another key feature is the growth rates of attractions. The EWA model controls
the growth rates by two decay parameters,  and , which depreciate attractions and
amount of experience separately. When  = , belief-based models result; when  = 0
choice reinforcement results.
Using three data sets, parameter estimates of the model were calibrated on part of
the data and used to predict the rest. Estimates of  are generally around .50,  around
1, and  varies from 0 to . Choice reinforcement models often outperform belief-based
models in the calibration phase and underperform in out-of-sample validation. Both
special cases are generally rejected in favor of EWA, though sometimes belief models do
better. EWA is able to combine the best features of both approaches, allowing attrac-
tions to begin and grow exibly as choice reinforcement does, but reinforcing unchosen
strategies substantially as belief-based models implicitly do.
Keywords: Learning, behavioral game theory, reinforcement learning, ctitious play.
Experience-weighted Attraction Learning
in Normal Form Games

Colin Camerer Teck-Hua Ho
1 Introduction
How does an equilibrium arise in a noncooperative game? While it is conceivable that
players reason their way to an equilibrium, a more psychologically plausible view is that
players adapt or evolve toward it.
1
The urry of recent research on adaptation and
evolution mostly explores theoretical questions, like which types of equilibria specic
evolutionary or adaptive rules converge to. We are interested in a fundamentally empir-
ical question: Which models describe human behavior best? In this paper we propose a
general `experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) model and estimate the model paramet-
rically, using three sets of experimental data.
The EWA model combines elements of two seemingly dierent approaches, and in-
cludes them as special cases. One approach, belief-based models, start with the premise
that players keep track of the history of previous play by other players and form some
belief about what others will do in the future based on past observation. Then they tend
to choose a best-response, a strategy which maximizes their expected payos given the
beliefs they formed.

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Like most good ideas in economics, the adaptive and evolutionary interpretations of equilibration
have a long pedigree. Weibull (1997) pointed out that in his famous passage, Adam Smith said that the
a division of labor, which emerged as a consequence of the `propensity to truck, barter, and exchange',
emerged in a `very slow and gradual' way (1981).
A dierent approach, choice reinforcement, assumes that strategies are `reinforced'
by their previous payos, and the propensity to choose a strategy depends in some way
on its stock of reinforcement. Players who learn by reinforcement do not generally have
beliefs about what other players will do. They care only about the payos strategies
yielded in the past, not about the history of play that created those payos.
The belief and reinforcement approaches have been treated as fundamentally dierent
since the 1950s. Until recently, nobody asked whether the two might be related, or how.
But like two rivers with a surprising common source, or children raised apart who turn
out to be siblings, belief and reinforcement are special kinds of one learning model. We
suspect that the common heritage of these approaches was not discovered earlier because
the information used by each approach is so dierent. Belief-based models do not specially
reect past successes (reinforcements) of chosen strategies. Reinforcement models do not
reect the history of how others played. The EWA approach includes both as special
cases by incorporating both kinds of information, using three modelling features.
The crucial feature is how strategies are reinforced. In the choice reinforcement ap-
proach, when player 1 picks strategy s
i
1
, and player 2 picks s
j
2
, player 1's strategy s
i
1
is reinforced according to the payo 
1
(s
i
1
; s
j
2
). Unchosen strategies s
k
1
(k 6= i) are not
reinforced at all. In EWA, the unchosen strategies are reinforced based on a multiple
 of the payos 
1
(s
k
1
; s
j
2
) they would have earned. This makes psychological sense be-
cause research on human and animal learning shows that people learn from experiences
other than those which are directly reinforcing. (This expanded notion of reinforcement
therefore liberates choice reinforcement from the limits of behaviorist psychology, toward
something more cognitive and descriptive of humans.)
The second feature controls the growth rates of attractions. Attractions are numbers
that are monotonically related to the probability of choosing a strategy. In reinforcement
models attractions can grow and grow, which implies that convergence can be sharper
(in the sense that choice probabilities diverge toward one and zero). In belief learning,
attractions are expected payos, which are always bounded by the range of matrix payos.
The EWA model allows growth rates to vary between these two bounds by using separate
decay rates,  for past attractions, and  for the amount of experience (which normalizes
attractions).
The third modelling feature is initial attraction and experience weight. In belief
models initial attractions must be expected payos given prior beliefs. In reinforcement
models initial attractions are usually unrestricted. Therefore, initial attractions are un-
restricted in EWA too. The initial experience weight N(0) reects a strength of prior
in belief models, or the relative weight given to lagged attractions versus payos when
attractions are updated.
When  = 0,  = 0, and N(0) = 1, the EWA attractions of strategies are equal to
reinforcements, as used in many models. When  = 1 and  =  (and initial attractions
are determined by prior beliefs), the attractions of strategies are equal to their expected
payos given beliefs in a general class. That is, reinforcing each strategy according to
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what it would have earned (or did earn) is behaviorally equivalent to forming beliefs,
based on observed history, and calculating expected payos. The equivalence holds be-
cause looking back at what strategies earned (or would have) in the past is the same as
forming beliefs based on what others did in the past, then computing forward-looking
expected payos based on those backward-looking beliefs.
EWA tries to mix appropriate elements of reinforcement and belief learning ap-
proaches in a way which makes sense. We think this can be judged by whether the
parameters have clear psychological interpretations, and whether adding them improves
statistical t (adjusting, of course, for added degrees of freedom) and predictive accuracy.
To test the empirical usefulness of EWA, we derived maximum-likelihood parameter es-
timates from three data sets. The data sets span a wide range of games: Constant-sum
games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria; coordination games with multiple Pareto-
ranked equilibria; and `p-beauty contests' with unique dominance-solvable equilibria.
Some empirical studies have evaluated belief and reinforcement models, but most have
not compared them directly with statistical tests. Because EWA is a generalization which
reduces to belief and reinforcement learning when parameters have certain values, it is
easy to compare them to EWA and to each other.
In the next section, the EWA approach is dened and we show how a general class
of choice reinforcement and adaptive belief-based approaches are special cases. The
third section provides interpretations of the model parameters and discusses how they
relate to principles of human learning. The fourth section describes previous ndings
and shows how our empirical implementation goes further than earlier work. The fth
section reports parameter estimates from several data sets. The last section concludes
and mentions some future research directions.
2 The Experience-weighted Attraction (EWA)Model
We start with notation. We study n-person normal-form games. Players are indexed by i
(i = 1; : : : ; n), and the strategy space of player i, S
i
consists ofm
i
discrete choices, that is,
S
i
= fs
1
i
; s
2
i
; : : : ; s
m
i
 1
i
; s
m
i
i
g. S = S
1
 : : :S
n
is the Cartesian product of the individual
strategy spaces and is the strategy space of the game. s
i
2 S
i
denotes a strategy of player
i, and is therefore an element of S
i
. s = (s
1
; : : : ; s
n
) 2 S is a strategy combination, and it
consists of n strategies, one for each player. s
 i
= (s
1
; : : : ; s
i 1
; s
i+1
; : : : ; s
n
) is a strategy
combination of all players except i. S
 i
has a cardinality of m
 i
= 
n
j=1;j 6=i
m
j
. The
scalar-valued payo function of player i is 
i
(s
i
; s
 i
). Denote the actual strategy chosen
by player i in period t by s
i
(t), and the strategy (vector) chosen by all other players by
s
 i
(t). Denote player i's payo in a period t by 
i
(s
i
(t); s
 i
(t)).
EWA assumes each a strategy has a numerical attraction, which determines the prob-
ability of choosing that strategy (in a precise way made clear below). Learning models
require a specication of initial attractions, how attractions are updated by experience,
and how choice probabilities depend on attractions.
3
2.1 The EWA updating rules
The core of the EWA model is two variables which are updated after each round. The
rst variable is N(t), which we interpret as the number of `observation-equivalents' of
past experience. The second variable is A
j
i
(t), player i's attraction of strategy j after
period t has taken place.
The variables N(t) and A
j
i
(t) begin with some prior values, N(0) and A
j
i
(0). These
prior values can be thought of as reecting pregame experience, either due to learning
transferred from dierent games or due to introspection. (Then N(0) can be interpreted
as the number of periods of actual experience which is equivalent in attraction impact to
the pregame thinking.)
Updating is governed by two rules. First,
N(t) =  N(t  1) + 1; t  1: (1)
The parameter  is a depreciation rate or retrospective discount factor that measures the
fractional impact of previous experience, compared to one new period.
The second rule updates the level of attraction. A key component of the updating is
the payo that a strategy either yielded, or would have yielded, in a period. The model
weights hypothetical payos that unchosen strategies would have earned by a parameter
, and weights payos actually received, from chosen strategy s
i
(t), by an additional 1 
(so they receive a total weight of 1). Using an indicator function I(x; y) which equals 1
if x = y and 0 if x 6= y, the weighted payo can be written as [ + (1   )  I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t)] 

i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)).
The rule for updating attraction sets A
j
i
(t) to be the sum of a depreciated, experience-
weighted previous attraction A
j
i
(t  1) plus the (weighted) payo from period t, normal-
ized by the updated experience weight:
A
j
i
(t) =
 N(t  1) A
j
i
(t  1) + [ + (1  )  I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))]  
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t))
N(t)
: (2)
The factor  is a discount factor or decay rate, which depreciates previous attraction.
2.2 Choice reinforcement
In early reinforcement models (and some recent ones) choice probabilities are updated
directly (e.g., Bush and Mosteller, 1955; cf. Cross, 1983). In more recent models
4
(Harley, 1981; Roth and Erev, 1995), strategies have levels of reinforcement or propen-
sity which are incremented cumulatively by received payos (and perhaps normalized,
Arthur, 1991). We use the latter form, which gives more modelling freedom
2
and avoids
some clumsy technical features (imposing boundary conditions so probabilities do not
grow too high or low).
The initial reinforcement level of strategy j of player i, s
j
i
, is R
j
i
(0). These initial rein-
forcements can be assumed a priori (based on a theory of rst-period play) or estimated
from the data. Reinforcements are updated according to two principles:
R
j
i
(t) =
(
 R
j
i
(t  1) + 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)) if s
j
i
= s
i
(t);
 R
j
i
(t  1) if s
j
i
6= s
i
(t):
(3)
The two principles can be reduced to a single updating equation:
R
j
i
(t) =  R
j
i
(t  1) + I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))  
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)): (4)
It is easy to see that this updating formula is a special case of the EWA rule, when
 = 0, N(0) = 1, and  = 0. Thus, choice reinforcement in this form is a special case of
experience-weighted attraction learning.
3
2.3 Belief-based Models
In a belief-based model, players tend to choose strategies which have high expected
payos given beliefs formed by observing the history of what others did. While there are
many ways of forming beliefs, we consider a fairly large class of weighted ctitious play
models, which include familiar ones like ctitious play (Brown, 1951) and Cournot (1960)
2
In the Cross model, strategies have utilities which are weighted averages of past utilities and current
payos (for chosen strategies), and players maximize utility. Sarin (1995) shows that when the weight
on current payo declines over time, this model behaves similarly to the Harley version in which at-
tractions grow. The similarity reects the fact that both models build in a declining eect of marginal
reinforcements.
3
Some reinforcement models add other parameters. Roth and Erev (1995) add a parameter which cuts
o attractions close to zero, to avoid negative attractions. Erev and Roth (1997) add three parameters
which allow reinforcement to depend on payos minus an (updated) reference point (as in Bush and
Mosteller, 1955; Cross, 1983), where the updating may be dierent for losses and gains. They also add
a parameter which smears a portion of the chosen-strategy reinforcement to neighboring strategies, to
reect a kind of experimentation or generalization which is (locally) similar to our  parameter. Camerer
and Ho (1998) compare the local-generalization specication with  updating in the EWA model and
nd that local-generalization ts much worse.
5
best-response as special cases (see Fudenberg and Levine, 1995; Cheung and Friedman,
1997).
4
In the weighted ctitious play model, prior beliefs of opponents' strategy combinations
are expressed as a ratio of hypothetical counts of observations of strategy combination
s
k
 i
, denoted by N
k
 i
(0). These observations can then be naturally integrated with actual
observations as experience accumulates. (Carnap (1962) shows an elegant set of axioms
which implies this structure, which corresponds to Bayesian updating with a Dirichlet-
distributed prior.) In our view, specifying prior beliefs (and computing initial expected
payos based on the prior) is a crucial feature of belief models, though some papers have
not imposed this assumption. Without specifying a prior, there is no guarantee that the
updated beliefs which result from mixing initial expected payos with later experience
will be valid beliefs (i.e., nonnegative probabilities which sum to one).
We also allow past experience to be depreciated or discounted by a factor  (pre-
sumably between zero and one). Formally, the prior beliefs for player i about choices of
others are specied by a vector of relative frequencies of choices of strategies s
k
 i
, denoted
N
k
 i
(0). Call the sum of those frequencies (dropping the player subscript for simplicity)
N(t) =
P
m
 i
k=1
N
k
 i
(t). Then the initial prior B
k
 i
(0) is:
B
k
 i
(0) =
N
k
 i
(0)
N(0)
; (5)
with N
k
 i
(0)  0 and N(0) > 0. Beliefs are updated by depreciating the previous counts
by , and adding one for the strategy combination actually chosen by the other players.
That is,
B
k
 i
(t) =
 N
k
 i
(t  1) + I(s
k
 i
; s
 i
(t))
P
m
 i
h=1
[ N
h
 i
(t  1) + I(s
h
 i
; s
 i
(t))]
: (6)
Expressing beliefs in terms of previous-period beliefs,
B
k
 i
(t) =
 B
k
 i
(t  1) +
I(s
k
 i
;s
 i
(t))
N(t 1)
 +
1
N(t 1)
=
 N(t  1) B
k
 i
(t  1) + I(s
k
 i
; s
 i
(t))
 N(t  1) + 1
: (7)
4
When the description `ctitious play' is used below, we mean traditional ctitious play in which
all past observations are weighted equally. Also, Camerer and Ho (1998) estimate models in which 
varies across periods, which generalizes weighted ctitious play to include cases where the weight rises or
falls over time. Allowing a time-varying weight does not improve t much, so assuming a xed  seems
reasonable.
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This form of belief updating weights observations from one period ago  times as
much as the most recent observation. This includes Cournot dynamics ( = 0; only the
most recent observation counts) and ctitious play ( = 1; all observations count equally)
as special cases. The general case 0    1 is a compromise in which all observations
count but more recent observations count more.
Expected payos in period t, E
j
i
(t), are taken over beliefs according to
E
j
i
(t) =
m
 i
X
k=1

i
(s
j
i
; s
k
 i
) B
k
 i
(t): (8)
The crucial step is to express period t expected payos as a function of period t   1
expected payos. Substituting equation (2.7) into (2.8) and rearranging yields:
E
j
i
(t) =
 N(t  1) E
j
i
(t  1) + (s
j
i
; s
 i
(t))
 N(t  1) + 1
: (9)
This equation makes the kinship between EWA and belief approaches transparent.
Formally, suppose initial attractions are equal to expected payos given initial beliefs
which arise from the `experience-equivalent' strategy counts N
k
 i
(0), so A
j
i
(0) = E
j
i
(0) =
P
m
 i
k=1

i
(s
j
i
; s
k
 i
) B
k
 i
(0). Then substituting  = 1 and  =  into the attraction updating
equation (2) gives attractions which are exactly the same as updated expected payos in
(9). Hence, the weighted belief models are a special case of EWA.
The close relation between reinforcement and belief learning is surprising because
the two approaches have generally been treated as fundamentally dierent (e.g., Selten,
1991, p 14). However, some connection between reinforcement and belief learning was
recognized very recently by others (unbeknownst to us). Fudenberg and Levine (1995, pp.
1084-1085) and Cheung and Friedman (1997, p. 54-55) both pointed out that expected
payos computed using ctitious play beliefs, and based on history, are asymptotically
the same as histories of actual payos. But their arguments are based on long-run
asymptotic equivalence between a distribution (possible payos) and a sample from it
(actual payos). Neither seemed to explicitly recognize that even in the short run, there
is an exact equivalence between a special kind of reinforcement learning (EWA) and
weighted ctitious play.
5
5
For example, Cheung and Friedman (1997) make their point by "assum[ing] for the moment (very
counterfactually!), that the player somehow managed to play both strategies each period". Then "drop-
ping the counterfactual", they show that the average experienced payos will correspond, up to some
noise, to expected payos. Counterfactual simulation of foregone payos is precisely the mental process
invoked by  in EWA. However, the `noise' is correlated with past observations which are included explic-
itly in EWA, so the relation between EWA and weighted ctitious play is exact rather than approximate.
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The contrast with EWA makes clear that belief models actually make three separate
assumptions: Players' initial attractions are expected payos based on some prior; play-
ers update attractions using EWA with  = 1; and attractions are a weighted average of
lagged attractions and payos ( = ). We think the most intuitively appealing assump-
tion is the best-responsiveness to foregone payos embodied in  = 1, rather than the
weighted-average restriction  =  or the restriction on rst-period play. EWA allows
one to separate the three features of belief learning: Players could have attractions which
begin and grow dierently than belief models assume, but update those attractions in a
belief-learning way. Such players are a special kind of EWA learner.
The nonlinear interplay of parameters in the EWA updating rules is why, as a model
of human learning, EWA is potentially superior to simply running a regression of choices
against reinforcements and expected payos or combining the two in a weighted average.
Reinforcements and expected payos dier in three crucial dimensions{ initial attractions
and experience weight N(0), the weight  on foregone payos in updating attractions, and
whether attractions can grow outside the bounds of possible payos (which depends on
 and ). EWA is not a convex combination of reinforcement and belief models because
these three dimensions are controlled by separate parameters. That is, a weighted average
in which expected payos are given weight  and reinforcements have weight 1    will
update attractions like EWA does, but that weighted average will not allow the wide
range of initial attractions, experience rates, and growth rates available in EWA.
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2.4 Choice probabilities
Attractions must determine probabilities of choosing strategies in some way. P
j
i
(t) should
be monotonically increasing in A
j
i
(t) and decreasing in A
k
i
(t) (where k 6= j). Three forms
have been used in previous research: Exponential (logit), power, and normal (probit). In
estimation reported below we use the logit function, which is commonly used in studies
of choice under risk and uncertainty, brand choice, etc. (Ben-Akiva and Leman, 1985;
Anderson, Palma and Thisse, 1992), and is given by
P
j
i
(t+ 1) =
e
A
j
i
(t)
P
m
i
k=1
e
A
k
i
(t)
: (10)
The parameter  measures sensitivity of players to attractions. Sensitivity could vary
due to the psychophysics of perception or whether subjects are highly motivated or not.
In this probability function, the exponent in the numerator is just the weighted eect
of strategy j's attraction,   A
j
i
(t), on the probability of choosing strategy j. Models
in which cross-eects of attractions on other strategies' choice probabilities are allowed
6
Indeed, Camerer and Ho (1998) show that EWA ts much better than a convex combination of
belief and reinforcement learning, in two coordination games.
8
have been estimated (Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1997) but we do not have the degrees of
freedom to do so.
7
The logit, power, and probit probability functions each have advantages and disad-
vantages. The exponential form has been used to study learning in games by Mookerjhee
and Sopher (1994, 1997), Ho and Weigelt (1996), and Fudenberg and Levine (in press),
and in `quantal response equilibrium' models by Chen, Friedman and Thisse (in press)
and McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1996). Cheung and Friedman (1997) used the probit
form. The exponential form is are invariant to adding a constant to all attractions.
8
As
a result, negative values of A
j
i
(0) are permissible, which means one can avoid the dicult
question of how to update attractions when payos are negative.
9
The power probability form is given by
P
j
i
(t+ 1) =
(A
j
i
(t))

P
m
i
k=1
(A
k
i
(t))

: (11)
The power form is invariant to multiplying all attractions by a constant. Because of
this invariance, the parameters N(0) and  make no dierence when the power form is
used (i.e., they are not identied).
10
Depending on one's purpose, being able to ignore N(0) and  can be an advantage or
disadvantage. For the purpose of distinguishing dierent models, it is a big disadvantage
because models impose dierent restrictions on N(0) and . By using the power form,
7
In Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997), the exponent in the probability equation numerator is the sum
of weighted eects of all the attractions,
P
m
i
k=1

jk
 A
k
i
(t), where 
jk
is the cross-eect of strategy k's
attraction on strategy j's score. This model allows cross-eects in which one strategy's attraction can
aect other strategies' choice probabilities dierently. These cross-eects are hard to interpret without
knowing more about similarity of strategies or some other basis for one strategy's attraction to aect
others dierently. Nonetheless, they have some signicance as a whole in the Mookerjhee-Sopher analysis
of constant-sum games. Estimating them for our median-action and p-beauty contest data uses up far
too many degrees of freedom because there are too many strategies. Including cross-eects could proceed
particularly eciently if some structural considerations were used to restrict coecients a priori (as in
Sarin and Vahid's, 1997, use of strategy similiarity).
8
As a result, one must normalize A
j
i
(0) to equal a constant for one value of j in order to identify
parameters. There is some evidence that adding a constant to payos does matter (Bereby-Meyer and
Erev, 1997) but there is also evidence that logit ts better than power, so we regard the choice of proper
form as a matter of one's purpose and yet-unresolved empirical debate.
9
Borgers and Sarin (1996) avoid this problem by adding x to all other strategies when a chosen
strategy loses x.
10
The parameter  disappears because it only appears in the updating equation denominator  
N(t   1) + 1 which is common to all attractions and thus cancels out in the power form. Then EWA
attractions at time t depend only on recent payos and the product A
j
i
(0) N(0) . While initial choice
probabilities depend on A
j
i
(0) only, these probabilities are the same as those that depend on A
j
i
(0) N(0)
(for N(0) > 0). As a result, multiplying the initial attractions by an arbitrary constant makes no
dierence (econometrically, N(0) is not identiable).
9
the dierence between belief-based, reinforcement, and EWA models, besides initial at-
tractions, is only one parameter, , rather than three parameters. For the purposes of
estimating any one model reliably, however, conserving degrees of freedom is good so the
power form is better. Since our main purpose in this paper is comparing models, having
the extra tools to distinguish theories is a large advantage so we use the logit form rather
than the power form. This choice of probability rule is, of course, not an essential part
of the EWA model.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the logit, probit or power forms t
better (adjusting for degrees of freedom). Previous studies show roughly equal ts of
logit and power (Tang, 1996; Chen and Tang 1996; Erev and Roth, 1997) or better ts
for the logit form over the power form (Camerer and Ho, 1998).
3 Interpreting EWA parameters
We think it is crucial to ask how a learning model's parameters can be interpreted, what
general behavioral principles of learning they capture, and, for EWA, how it reveals
assumptions implicit in reinforcement and belief learning. Asking these questions about
any learning theory avoids the danger of adding parameters just to improve statistical t,
without adding new insight or respecting what is known in other disciplines. In addition,
if parameters have natural psychological interpretations they can be measured in other
ways (e.g., response times and attention measures) and used in psychological modelling.
3.1 Learning principles and 
The parameter  measures the relative weight given to foregone payos, compared to
actual payos, in updating attractions. This is the most important parameter in EWA
because it shows most clearly the dierent ways in which EWA, reinforcement and belief
models capture two basic principles of learning{ the law of actual eect and the law of
simulated eect.
Many decades of learning experiments, mostly with (nonhuman) animal subjects,
show that successful chosen strategies are subsequently chosen more often. Behaviorist
psychologists call this the `law of eect' (Thorndike, 1911; Herrnstein, 1970). We rela-
bel this the `law of actual eect' because behaviorists took it for granted for years that
the only eect on subsequent choices was produced by rewards for actual choices. The
behaviorists eschewed `mentalist' constructs like imagination, which allowed the possi-
bility that foregone rewards could aect the probability of choosing new strategies, until
a series of demonstrations showed that those cognitive constructs are necessary. When
applied to humans playing games with a known payo matrix, it is sensible to propose a
corollary general principle, the `law of simulated eect'. The law of simulated eect states
that unchosen strategies which would have yielded high payos{ simulated successes{ are
10
more likely to be chosen subsequently. Many experiments on reinforcement learning are
consistent with this principle.
11
Furthermore, most research on human and machine learning assumes that the basic
process driving learning is not reinforcement, per se, but the reduction of errors. Since
errors are measured by the dierence between what players received and what they could
have received, error-reduction algorithms use both actual payos and foregone payos
too, obeying both the law of actual eect and the law of simulated eect.
The empirical strengths of the law of eect and the law of simulated eect are the
key to distinguishing dierent models of learning in games, and are calibrated by .
Reinforcement insists that only actual eects matter (=0). Belief models implicitly
require that actual and simulated eects are equally strong ( = 1). EWA takes the
middle ground.
The parameter  also can be seen as a way of endogenizing a reference point or
aspiration level. Many studies show that the reinforcement value of a xed payo can
vary, depending on what aspiration level the payo is compared to. Some reinforcement
models build in an aspiration level directly, and adjust it across time based on observed
payos, which requires at least two free parameters (an initial level and an adjustment
rate). In EWA, reinforcing strategies according to foregone payos means the probability
of a chosen strategy s
i
(t) only increases if its payo is larger than  times the average
foregone payo (see our working paper for details). Thus, a larger  creates a more
extreme aspiration level. EWA therefore creates an endogeneous, adjustable reference
point at no extra parametric cost.
If  is interpreted as the weight placed on foregone payos, many generalizations
spring to mind. The size of the weight  could depend on the size of the foregone payo
or on its sign, to allow the possibilities that unusually large or small foregone payos
catch a player's attention, or that players are more sensitive to losses than to gains (cf.
loss-aversion in risky choices, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). If players are more
sensitive to foregone payos for strategies which are closer to the chosen strategy, or more
similar, then  will depend on the distance or similarity between each strategy and the
chosen strategy s
i
(t) (cf. Sarin and Vahid, 1997).
11
For example, anxious patients can be taught to fear a picture of a triangle (a conditioned stimulus, or
CS) when it is followed by a loud annoying noise (an unconditioned stimulus, or UCS). When patients
are told to simply imagine the UCS several times, their imagination increases the strength of their
conditioned fear response to the triangle CS (Davey and Matchett, 1990). A related phenomenon is
`incubation', in which presentation of the CS itself increases the fear response (Eysenck, 1979). In
these cases, people are not learning by direct reinforcement, but merely by imagining either the UCS's
reinforcement, or the reinforcement which typically follows a CS. There is also vast evidence that children
and primates (and of course, adult humans too) learn by imitating others, which illustrates another kind
of learning from simulated or hypothetical eects.
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3.2 Growth of Attractions,  and 
The parameter  depreciates past attractions, A
j
i
(t).
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The parameter  depreciates the
experience measure N(t). It captures decay in the strength of prior beliefs, which can be
dierent than decay of early attraction (captured by ). These factors combine cognitive
phenomena like forgetting with a deliberate tendency to discount old experience when
the environment is changing.
One way to interpret  and  is by considering the numerator and denominator of the
main EWA updating equation (2.2) separately, and thinking about how reinforcement and
belief-based models use these two terms dierently. The numerator is  N(t 1) A
j
i
(t 
1) + [+ (1  )  I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))]  
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)). This term is a running total of (depreciated)
attraction, updated by each period's payos. The denominator is  N(t  1) + 1. This
term is a running total of (depreciated) periods of experience-equivalence. Reinforcement
models essentially keep track of the running total in the numerator, and do not adjust
for the number of periods of experience-equivalence (since  = 0, the denominator is
always one). Belief-based models also keep track of the attraction total but divide by the
total number of periods of experience-equivalence. By depreciating the two totals at the
same rate ( = ), the belief-based models keeps the `per-period' attractions (expected
payos) in a range bounded by the game's payos.
EWA allows attractions to grow faster than an average, but slower than a cumulative
total. An analogy might help illustrate. Instead of determining attractions of strategies,
think about evaluating a person (for example, an athlete, or a senior colleague you might
hire) based on a stream of lifetime performances. The reinforcement model evaluates
people based on (depreciated) lifetime performance. The belief-based models evaluate
people based on `average' (depreciated) performance. Both statistics are probably useful
in evaluation{ in hiring a colleague or an athlete, you would want to know lifetime
performance and some kind of performance averaged across experience. One way to mix
the two is to normalize depreciated cumulative performance by depreciated experience,
but depreciate the amount of experience more rapidly. Then if two people perform equally
well on average every year, the person with 10 years of experience is rated somewhere
between equally as good and twice as good as the person with ve years of experience.
When  > , EWA models players who use something in between `lifetime' performance
and `average' performance to evaluate strategies.
The depreciation rate parameters  and  can also be understood by how they control
slowdown in learning rate or sharpness of convergence. Solving recursively for steady-
state attraction levels shows that those levels equal the ratio
1 
1 
times the steady-state
average payo. Thus, when  = 0 as in reinforcement learning, attractions can end
up outside the bounds of payo levels (and they grow as large as possible, holding 
constant). When  = , as in belief-learning, steady-state attraction levels are equal
to steady-state average payos. The implication of these two possibilities depends on
12
A `primacy eect' (or `imprinting', Cheung and Friedman, 1997), in which early observations are
remembered more strongly than recent ones, can be expressed by   1.
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how attractions determine probabilities. In the logit probability form, only dierences in
attraction levels aect choice probabilities. Therefore, given a xed value of , attractions
which can grow outside the bounds of payo levels have a wider range across strategies.
This allows the possibility of sharper convergence in the sense that choice probabilities
can converge closer to the boundaries at zero and one.
When attractions are bounded to be close to payo levels, convergence cannot be as
sharp. In the power probability form, only ratios of attraction levels matter. Therefore,
if attractions grow the relative impact of new reinforcements falls; learning slows down.
Ceteris paribus, reinforcement learning requires convergence to be as sharp as possible
(in the logit form) or requires learning to slow down as quickly as possible (in the power
form), while belief learning requires the opposite. EWA is able to choose an intermediate
value of  which tailors the sharpness of convergence or rate of learning to the data.
3.3 Initial attractions A
j
i
(0) and their strength N(0)
The term A
j
i
(0) represents the initial attraction, which might be derived from an anal-
ysis of the game, from surface similarity between strategies and strategies which were
successful in similar games, etc. Belief models restrict the A
j
i
(0) strongly by requiring
initial attractions to be derived from prior beliefs. This requires, for example, that weakly
dominated strategies will always have (weakly) lower initial attractions than dominant
strategies. EWA allows more exibility.
For example, suppose players make rst-period choices randomly, by choosing what
was chosen previously in a dierent game, by setting each strategy's initial attraction
equal to its minimum payo (the maximin rule) or maximum payo (the maximax
rule)
13
, or by choosing stochastically among selection principles like payo-dominance,
risk-dominance, loss-avoidance, etc. All these decision rules are plausible models of rst-
period play, but none of them generate initial attractions which are always expected
payos given some prior beliefs.
We consider the scientic problem of guring out how people choose their initial
strategies as fundamentally dierent than explaining how they learn. Leaving initial at-
tractions unrestricted makes them numerical placeholders which can be lled by a theory
of rst-period play which supplies attractions as an input to EWA. That combination
would be a complete theory of behavior in games, from start to nish.
The initial-attraction weight N(0) appears in the EWA model to allow players in
belief-based models to have an initial prior which has a certain strength (measured in
units of actual experience). In EWA, N(0) is therefore naturally interpreted as the
13
Making a strategy's initial attraction equal to its minimum payo, for example, is implicitly putting
all the belief weight on the choices by others which yield that minimum. But the choices by others which
lead to minima for dierent strategies are likely to be dierent. So the implicit beliefs underlying each
attraction will be dierent.
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strength of initial attractions, relative to incremental changes in attractions due to actual
experience and payos. Fixing N(0) = 1 means that, unit for unit, initial attractions
A
j
i
(0) and chunks of reinforcement from payos are weighed equally when attractions are
updated. This is easiest to see by xing  = 1 for simplicity and directly computing the
attraction after two periods, A
j
i
(2), which gives
A
j
i
(2) =

2
 A
j
i
(0) N(0) +   
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(1)) +
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(2))

2
N(0) +  + 1
: (12)
The parameter  captures the declining weight placed on payos from more distant
periods of actual experience, compared to more recent periods. (That is, the older period
1 payo 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(1)) is weighted by  but the recent period 2 payo 
i
(s
j
i
; s
 i
(2)) is not.)
Like previous payos, the initial attraction is also weighted by a power of  (
2
, because it
`happened' two periods earlier), but is also weighted by N(0). Thus, the parameter N(0)
captures the special weight placed on the initial attractions, compared to increments in
attraction due to payos. N(0) can therefore be thought of as a `pre-game (introspective)
experience' weight. If N(0) is small the eect of the initial attractions is quickly displaced
by experience. If N(0) is large then the eect of the initial attractions persists.
Notice that updating the experience-weight by N(t) =   N(t   1) + 1 implies a
steady-state value of N

=
1
1 
. In estimation, we have found it useful to restrict N(0)
to be less than N

. This implies N(t   1)  N(t); the experience weight is (weakly)
rising over time. Since the relative weight on decayed attractions, compared to recent
reinforcement, is always increasing, the relative weight on observed payos is always
declining. This implies a `law of declining eect' which is widely observed in research of
learning.
The exibility of initial attractions and experience weight allows one to t a variety
of models. Theories of equilibrium behavior are special cases in which all `learning'
occurs before the game starts. For example, a `stubborn' game-theoretically-minded
player sets A
j
i
(0) equal to the equilibrium payos of each strategy and act as if N(0)
is innite (meaning that no amount of game-playing experience can outweigh the prior
calculation). An adaptive game theorist assumes A
j
i
(0) are equilibrium payos but has
a small N(0), so she learns from experience. A player who does not begin with prior
beliefs, but updates according to experience as a belief learner does, has  =  and  = 1
with arbitrary A
j
i
(0).
Other features could conceivably be included. Players who tend to repeat previously-
chosen strategies, regardless of their outcomes, reveal a `status quo bias' or `habit' (Ma-
jure, 1995). Similarly, imitative learning is just acquiring somebody else's habit It is not
clear how to add this feature to EWA because it presumes payo-independent reinforce-
ment of chosen strategies.
14
4 Previous research
In this section we briey summarize previous research (see Camerer, in progress, for more
details).
Several papers investigate only belief learning. Cheung and Friedman (1997) (CF) es-
timated a weighted ctitious play model on individual-level data from four games (hawk-
dove, stag hunt, `buyer seller' and battle-of-the-sexes). They nd substantial heterogene-
ity across subjects but stability across games in the equivalents of  and . A general
belief model (allowing idiosyncratic shocks in beliefs) was developed by Crawford (1995)
to t data from coordination games, extended by Broseta (1997) to allow ARCH er-
ror terms, and applied by Crawford and Broseta (in press) to coordination with preplay
auctions. Brandts and Holt (in press) and Cooper, Kagel, and Garvin (1997) simulate c-
titious play in signaling games. Boylan and El-Gamal (1992) compare ctitious play and
Cournot learning in coordination and dominance-solvable games; they nd overwhelming
relative support for ctitious play.
Other studies concentrate only on reinforcement learning. Versions of reinforcement
in which probabilities were reinforced directly, or cumulative payos normalized, were
used by Bush and Mosteller (1955), Cross (1983) and Arthur (1991). Harley (1981)
posited a reinforcement model using cumulative payos and simulated its behavior in
several games. The Harley model was later extended by Roth and Erev (1995) to include
spillover of reinforcement to neighboring strategies. Their model ts the time trends
in ultimatum, public good, and responder-competition games but converges much too
slowly. McAllister (1991) shows that a modied Cross model which uses foregone payo
information ts weak-link data modestly well. Sarin and Vahid (1997) show that a mod-
ied Cross model with distance-weighted spillover of reinforcement to similar strategies
ts data on coordination experiments with low information fairly well.
These studies of belief and reinforcement learning nd that each approach, evaluated
separately, has some explanatory power. Other studies compared models.
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Erev and
Roth (1997) add an adjustable reference point to their earlier model (cf. Cross, 1983).
The extended model ts slightly better than ctitious play, at the individual level, in
constant-sum games played for 100 or more periods. Mookerjhee and Sopher (1994,1997)
(MS) compare average-payo reinforcement and ctitious play in constant-sum games;
reinforcement does somewhat better. Ho and Weigelt (1996) compare modied versions
of ctitious play and choice reinforcement (the MS `vindication' model) in coordination
games with multiple Nash equilibria. Fictitious play ts better.
Many variants of weighted ctitious play and reinforcement (and other models) were
compared by Tang (1996a,b) in games with mixed-strategy equilibria. Reinforcement
does better in most games. Chen and Tang (1996) t models to data from two public
14
In still another approach, models in which players learn to shift weight across various rules (or
`methods'), rather than across strategies, were studied by Tang and by Stahl (1996, 1997). In Tang's
comparison `method-learning' does slightly worse than reinforcement. Stahl (1997) nds that players
seem to weight rules which mimic choices of others or best-respond given diuse priors.
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goods games. In one game equilibration is so fast that Nash equilibrium outpredicts the
learning models. In the other game reinforcement does better.
The overall picture from previous research is somewhat blurry. Comparisons appears
to favor reinforcement over belief learning in constant-sum games but specications of
the models, estimation techniques, and games vary across studies. Our approach allows
one to compare models more systematically by including features which have been used
dierently in dierent studies. Two general features are notable.
First, most papers assume equal initial attractions or, for belief models, uniform
priors. Some papers estimate initial attractions using rst-period data (which does not
generally optimize overall t). Our procedure is more general because we estimate initial
attractions and experience weight as part of an overall maximization of t. Estimating
initial experience weight N(0) allows belief models to express a prior strength. This is
an important feature of belief learning; omitting it may explain why belief models have
sometimes t relatively poorly (in Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1997; Tang, 1996a; Chen and
Tang, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1997).
Second, some reinforcement models assume averaged-payos aect choices, while oth-
ers assume reinforcements cumulate. This dierence can be captured by allowing  to
vary between  (for averaging) and 0 (for maximum cumulation), as EWA does. In
addition, some studies of belief learning did not allow weighted ctitious play, as EWA
does. Including  and  therefore allows us to determine whether previous mixed results
depend on whether reinforcements are averaged or cumulated, and on whether belief
models are weighted.
Our methodology for model estimation is more general than most earlier papers in
four ways. First, we compare across three classes of games using the same estimation
technique (only Cheung and Friedman (1997) have done this in one paper). Second,
our method uses standard statistical tests to judge whether dierences in t are due
to chance, or put dierently, to decide whether simple models are too simple or not.
(Only Stahl (1996, 1997) compared models using tests which correct for the number of
free parameters.) Third, we calibrate models on the rst 70% of the periods in each
sample and predict the rest of the sample to validate the estimates and avoid overtting
(no previous paper has done this). Fourth, we allow heterogeneity across individuals by
comparing a model with a single class of agents with a two-segment model, which has
not been done before.
15
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The only paper which estimates individual-level parameters on these kinds of models is Cheung and
Friedman (1997). While the median parameter estimates are reasonable and similar across games when
expected to be, the individual-level estimates are variable (e.g., a third of the  estimates are negative
and a sixth are above one). This reects some imprecision in individual-level estimation which suggests
that multiple-segment estimation, which lies between single-segment estimation and individual-level
estimation may be a reasonably parsimonious compromise between the desires to allow heterogeneity
and to estimate reliably.
16
5 Parameter Estimation from Experimental Data
5.1 Estimation Strategy
We estimated the values of model parameters from three samples of experimental data
16
and validate the models by predicting behavior out of sample. The games are: Constant-
sum games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria (and one weakly dominated strategy);
a `median-action' coordination with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria; and a dominance-
solvable `p-beauty contest' game with a unique equilibrium. We chose these games for
several reasons.
First, the games have a range of dierent structural features (as in Cheung and
Friedman (1997) and Stahl (1997)). This avoids the possible mistake of concluding that
a model generally ts well because it happens to t one class of games.
Second, the games have dierent spans{ the constant-sum games last 40 periods and
the others last 10 periods. Longer spans provide more data and more power for estimating
individual dierences. But a mixture of long and short spans are valuable too, because
some games{ like the coordination and beauty contest games reported below{ converge
fairly rapidly. Learning models should be able to explain why convergence is fast in those
games and slow in others.
Third, most previous studies have reported results which are favorable to either re-
inforcement or belief learning. The games we use each present some new challenges to
these models. The presence of dominated strategies in the constant-sum games is a chal-
lenge for belief models, which predict those strategies will be played relatively rarely.
Rapid convergence in the coordination and dominance-solvable games is a challenge for
reinforcement learning (see also Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin, 1997).
Next we describe some general features of the estimation method. For simplicity
we assume that players' strategies are the stage-game strategies, and denote player i's
strategy choice in period t by s
i
(t). (Of course, in general strategies could be history-
dependent or be decision rules.)
We use a `latent class' approach in which there are one or two segments of players, and
all players in a segment are assumed to have the same parameter values. This technique
is standard in some elds (e.g., analyses of brand choice in marketing) and was also sug-
gested by Crawford (1995).
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The single-class estimation provides a representative-agent
16
Our working paper includes two other samples of data, on weak-link coordination games and match-
ing pennies (Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1994). We dropped these because the weak-link results did not
have a long enough span to permit both calibration and validation; calibration is reported in Camerer
and Ho, 1997). The matching pennies data did not distinguish models from each other or from Nash
equilibrium.
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Note that even though all agents in a class have the same parameter values, after the rst period
they will be predicted to behave dierently because their actual choices and experiences vary.
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benchmark. Allowing a second class gives a clue about how important it is to allow het-
erogeneity. For example, our results show that in constant-sum games allowing a second
class hardly improves the t at all while t is improved substantially in coordination
games.
The two-class procedure makes sense because in these data sets there are not enough
observations per subject to reliably estimate many more classes.
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And while including
more segments would be desirable, assuming all players have the same parameters does
not impose a heavier penalty for some models than for others, so it is unlikely that the
two-class assumption will lead us to incorrectly favor one model over another.
We estimate initial attractions A
j
(0) (suppressing the player subscript). Assuming
equal initial attractions (or equal priors in belief models) saves degrees of freedom but
ts poorly in our data. Estimating initial attractions also creates numbers which may be
useful for constructing a good theory of rst-period play.
Let the stage game be repeated for T rounds. Recall that the indicator function
I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t)) is equal to 1 if s
j
i
= s
i
(t) and 0 otherwise. Dene the vector of initial attrac-
tions for player i to be A
i
(0)
def
= (A
1
i
(0); A
2
i
(0); : : : ; A
m
i
i
(0)). Since we study symmetric
games and assume all players have the same parameter values, for this paper there is a
common set of initial attractions A(0) = A
i
(0)8i. Dene the number of subjects by N .
The overall sample size, :7  T  N , is denoted by M . Then the log-likelihood function,
LL(A(0); N(0); ; ; ; ), is
LL(A(0); N(0); ; ; ; ) =
0:7T
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Keep in mind that in the exponential form, attractions are only identied up to a
constant, so we must x one of the A
j
(0) to equal a constant. We searched over parameter
values to maximize the LL function using the MAXLIK routine in GAUSS, which uses
a gradient method. To avoid converging to local optima we tried a variety of starting
points. We restricted ;  to be positive, 0  ;   1.
In order to make the value of N(0) interpretable as a weight on initial attractions
relative to reinforcing payos, we restricted the range of A
j
(0) to be less than or equal
to the dierence between the minimum and maximum payos (while also setting one
18
Two segments are also useful because one can then compare a two-segment EWA model with a
two-segment model in which one segment are reinforcement learners and the other segment are belief
learners. We did this in Camerer and Ho (1998) on weak-link and median-action data and EWA ts
much better than the mixture model.
18
of the attractions equal to zero for identiability).
19
Since this restriction is naturally
satised in belief models, in order to compare EWA to belief and reinforcement learning
we imposed it in EWA and reinforcement as well.
20
We also restricted 0  N(0) 
1
1 
to guarantee that the weights N(t) rise over time.
Standard errors of parameters were estimated using a jackknife procedure. In each
run of the jackknife, one subject was excluded from the analysis and the model was
estimated using all remaining subjects.
21
Doing this sequentially produces N vectors of
estimates (where N is the number of subjects). The parameter standard errors are then
the standard deviations of parameter estimates across the N runs. (Correlations between
parameters can also be computed this way, and help detect identication problems.)
Since EWA is always more general than the special cases, it will necessarily t the data
better so there is some danger of overtting. To guard against this, we both calibrate
the models and validate them, by deriving MLE estimates using the rst 70% of the
observations in each sample, then using these estimates to predict the path of play in the
remaining 30% of the sample. This procedure uses enough data to estimate parameters
reliably, but also forecasts out-of-sample to ensure models are not being overt. To
evaluate model accuracy in the calibration phase, we report four criteria: Log likelihoods,
Akaike and Bayesian information criteria which penalize theories according to the number
of free parameters,
22
and a pseudo-R
2
which is denoted 
2
.
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For the validation sample
we report the log likelihood and also compute a mean squared deviation (MSD), which
is dened as
MSD =
T
X
t=:7T+1
N
X
i=1
m
i
X
j=1
[P
j
i
(t)  I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))]
2
:3  T N m
i
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(Note that this MSD does not average observations across individuals.) Model ts are
also compared to a random choice model in which all strategies are chosen equally often
in each period. We do not compare results with Nash equilibrium because it does very
poorly in constant sum games and beauty-contest games (in which iteratively-dominated
strategies predicted to have zero probability are often played) and does not exclude any
choices in the coordination games.
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If the attractions are not restricted in this way, then the experience weight N(0) expresses both the
relative weight on initial attractions and payos, and a scaling factor which puts attractions and payos
on the same scale. By restricting attractions to have the same range as payos, we can then interpret
N(0) as a relative weight.
20
In our working paper we allowed initial attractions to have arbitrary scale, which made MLE con-
vergence slower and identication worse. Allowing arbitrary attractions helps reinforcement a bit in
constant-sum games but does not help much in median-action and beauty-contest games.
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For the constant-sum games, with only twenty subjects per game, every pair of row and column
players were excluded, giving 100 jackknife runs.
22
The Akaike criterion (AIC) is LL  k and the Bayesian criterion (BIC) is LL 
k
2
 log(M) where k
is the number of degrees of freedom and M is the size of the calibration sample.
23
The measure 
2
is the dierence between the Akaike measure and the log likelihood of a model of
random choices, normalized by the random-model log likelihood.
19
For each game, we describe the game and basic details of how the experiments were
conducted. Then we compare models and discuss parameter estimates.
Table 1 previews and summarizes the results. Within each game and measure, other
than LL and 
2
, the best t statistic is printed in italics and marked with an asterisk.
In both the calibration and validation phases, EWA ts substantially better in four of
six games; in two cases the belief models t a little better. (If EWA was overtting, it
would do relatively better in calibration than in validation, but this isn't the case.) Belief
models do better than reinforcement in constant-sum games and worse in the median-
action game. In the beauty contest game, the belief model does worse than reinforcement
during calibration and better during validation. The two-segment models generally t
a little better during both validation and calibration, but the improvement in t over
one-segment models is small.
||||||||||||||
[Table 1 about here]
||||||||||||||
5.2 Constant-sum games with dominated actions
We t data from four constant-sum games: two are 4x4 (G1 and G3) and the other are
6x6 (G2 and G4) from Mookherjee and Sopher (1997). Tables 2a-2b show the payo
matrices.
24
The 4x4 games essentially collapse three of the undominated actions (actions
3-5) of the 6x6 games into a single action (action 3).
||||||||||||||
[Tables 2a-b about here]
||||||||||||||
Note that these games each have a weakly dominated action (action 4 in G1 and G3
and 6 in G2 and G4). Dominated actions are useful for model discrimination because
belief-based models always predict these actions will be chosen (weakly) less frequently
than dominant actions, whereas the arbitrary initial attractions allowed by EWA and
choice reinforcement can allow frequent choices of dominated strategies.
All these games have a unique mixed strategy equilibrium which is symmetric (even
though the games are not symmetric). In games G1 and G3, in equilibrium actions 1-4
are played with probabilities
3
8
;
2
8
;
3
8
; 0 respectively. In games G2 and G4, equilibrium
proportions are
3
8
;
2
8
;
1
8
;
1
8
;
1
8
; 0 for actions 1-6.
Each game was played by 10 dierent pairs of subjects playing with the same partner
24
The fractional payos (e.g., 2/3W), denote probabilistic chances of winning W. These present a
complication for reinforcement models, including EWA{ do you reinforce the actual payo (which has a
one-third chance of being zero if 2/3W is the payo) or the expected payo? We reinforce according to
the expected payo.
20
40 times. At the end of each period players were told their partner's choice and their own
payo. In games G1 and G2 a win paid 5 rupees; in games G3 and G4 the payos were
doubled to 10 rupees. (A typical student's monthly room and board cost 600 rupees.)
We derived MLE parameter estimates using the rst 28 periods, and validated by
predicting the last 12 periods. Because the payo matrix is not symmetric (even though
the equilibrium mixed-strategy proportions are), we estimate separate initial attractions
A
j
i
(0) and separate initial experience-weights N
j
i
(0) for row and column players (though
we restrict the total experience weight N(0) to be the same for both types of players).
Tables 3a-b show the MLE parameter estimates of the models, and 
2
tests of the belief
and reinforcement restrictions (along with p-values and degrees of freedom). We report
only the one-segment results because the two-segment results do not improve much and
oer no special insights.
Tables 3a-b shows that for one-segment models, belief-based models and choice rein-
forcement restrictions are weakly and strongly rejected by 
2
tests, respectively, in the
calibration phase. In the validation phase, the reinforcement model is worst. The belief
model is better than EWA in the four-strategy games G1 and G3, and worse in the six-
strategy games G2 and G4. These dierences are not large, however, and seem to be due
to an idiosyncracy in game G1.
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Tables 3a-b report parameter estimates and jackknifed standard errors. The initial
conditions
^
A
j
(0) are encouragingly similar in pairs of low- and high-stakes games (G1-
G3 and G2-G4), and put low initial attraction on the dominated strategies. The initial
experience weight
^
N(0) varies between about 10-20 and is close to its steady-state value of
1
1 
. This means that initial reinforcements do not have much eect, which is reasonable
given the slow convergence in these 40-period games. The decay parameters
^
 and ^
are close to one, with
^
 > ^. These numbers imply that attractions grow only slightly
on average. By forcing  = 0, in contrast, the reinforcement model forces attractions
to grow and `locks in' initial behavior too quickly. Finally,
^
 is between .4 and .7 and
signicantly dierent from both zero and one, except in game G1 where it is estimated
to be zero.
Notice how the EWA estimates reect a hybridization of elements of reinforcement
and belief learning. First, the initial EWA attractions place much less relative weight on
the dominated strategies (the highest-numbered strategies 4 or 6) than the corresponding
expected payos in belief models. In the belief model the gap between the initial expected
25
In game G1, EWA overts the rst 28 periods because it detects some upward trend in strategies S1
and S3, and a downward trend in S2. These trends are reversed in the last 12 periods so EWA predicts
poorly there. The belief model estimates dierences in initial expected payos but has a huge value of
^
N(0) = 300, so it doesn't predict much movement at all.
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payos of strategy 2 (the dominant strategies) and the dominated strategies cannot be
too large because the strategies are only weakly dominated. For example, in game G1
the estimated EWA attractions on row strategies 2 and 4 are 1.14 and .00, while the
corresponding estimated expected payos are 1.42 and .95, a gap less than half as large.
Thus, EWA exploits the exibility of initial attractions from reinforcement models to
squash the likelihood of playing weakly dominated strategies further down than belief
models can. Second, EWA borrows the belief-model property that attractions do not
grow much, since
^
 and ^ are very close. Third, the estimates of  around .5 (except G1)
reect both the law of simulated eect ( > 0) and stronger eects of actual payos than
foregone payos ( < 1).
Our conclusions about the relative performance of reinforcement and belief models
are dierent from the ndings of Mookerjhee and Sopher (1997), whose analysis diered
in a couple of important ways.
26
Their version of reinforcement used `average achieved
earnings' rather than (weighted) cumulative earnings. The fact that
^
 was very close to
^ in the EWA estimates indicates that MS took the right tack by using average earnings
rather than cumulative earnings, because the cumulative-earnings assumption predicts a
sharpness of convergence which is not evident in the data. However, their version of the
belief model (which uses time-averaged expected payos) does not begin with an initial
pre-game experience count expressing prior beliefs. Our estimates of N(0) range from 30
to 300, which means that the belief model does best when it starts with a strong prior and
updates very little. Thus, the dierence between our results and theirs is primarily due
to the fact that they use averaged reinforcements rather than cumulative ones (which
improves reinforcement relative to our method), and they did not allow strong prior
beliefs (which handicaps the belief model relative to our method).
Finally, notice that these constant-sum games do not distinguish models empirically
very well. Coordination games, in which players converge quickly, may prove to be a
better domain in which to distinguish theories.
5.3 Median-action games
We study median-action order statistic coordination games in which the group payo
depends on the median of all players' actions.
27
Table 4 shows the payo matrix. Players
earn a payo which increases in the median, and decreases in the (squared) deviation
from the median. The median-action games capture social situations in which conformity
26
Their analysis used logit estimation of strategy choices to judge whether choices depended more
strongly on a player's own average past earnings (a kind of choice reinforcement) or on expected earnings
based on opponent's past history (ctitious play). They also compared models based on the entire
previous history, weighting all observations equally, with models based on a ve-period moving average.
(The entire-history models t better.) They allowed cross-eects so that the attraction A
j
i
(t) can aect
other strategies dierently, which is more general than our approach.
27
Camerer and Ho (1997) also report estimates from `weak-link' coordination games in which the
group payo depends on the minimum. The parameter estimates are similar to those reported here{ for
example,
^
 is .65 and N(0) is around two.
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pressures induce people to behave like others do, but everyone prefers the group to choose
a high median.
These median-action games were rst studied experimentally by Van Huyck, Battalio
and Beil (VHBB,1991), whose data we use.
||||||||||||||
[Table 4 about here]
||||||||||||||
We estimate EWA, choice reinforcement, and belief models using sessions 1-6 from
VHBB (game ). In their experiments groups of nine subjects each play ten periods
together, so the sample has 54 subjects.
28
In each round players choose an integer from
1 to 7, inclusive. At the end of each round the median is announced (but not the full
distribution of choices) and players compute their payos. Since the groups are large,
we assume that players form beliefs over the median of all players, ignoring their own
inuence on the median and treating the group as a composite single player.
Figure 1a shows the actual frequencies across the six sessions, pooled together. Initial
choices are concentrated around 4-5, with a dip at 6 and small spikes at 3 and 7. Later
choices move sharply toward the initial medians, which were always 4 or 5. A striking
feature, which is masked by pooling sessions, is that the 10th-round median in every
session was equal to the rst-round median. In three sessions the median began at 4 and
stayed there; in the other three sessions the median began at 5 and stayed there.
>From a learning point of view, median-action games are interesting because the
penalty for deviating is fairly small if the players are close to equilibrium. Yet sharp
convergence occurs within a couple of periods. Learning models which assume choices
are reinforced must explain why players move quickly to equilibrium despite the large
reinforcement if they are close to equilibrium and the small extra gain from moving
precisely to equilibrium. The EWA model can account for this swift convergence if  is
close to one, which corresponds to the best-responsiveness inherent in belief learning.
||||||||||||||
[Figure 1a about here]
||||||||||||||
Table 5 shows estimation results for the median-action games. First we focus on one-
segment results. EWA ts better than the reinforcement model (
2
= 64:8) and much
better than the belief model (
2
= 258:9). The sources of EWA's improved t are evident
from looking at the data and plots of prediction errors.
||||||||||||||
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They compared two treatments using nine-person groups and `dual market' (dm) treatments in
which players play with a nine-person group and a twenty-seven person group simultaneously. There is
no apparent or statistically-signicant dierence between these treatments so we pool them together.
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[Table 5 about here]
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Figure 1a shows that in the actual data, there are two large spikes in initial choices at
4-5, smaller spikes (about 15% of the observations) at 3 and 7, and few observations at
6. The estimated EWA initial attractions basically reect this pattern in the data. The
accuracy of the reection can be judged from Figure 1b, an EWA error plot. This gure
shows the dierence between (MLE) predicted frequencies of the EWA model and the
actual frequencies. The largest error is that EWA underpredicts the frequency of choices
of 3 by about .06; predictions of 6 and 7 are too high by .03 and .01.
Reinforcement and belief learning cannot t the initial conditions as well as EWA, but
for dierent reasons. Reinforcement learning underpredicts the actual initial frequencies
of 3 and 7 by about .08. Players who chose strategy 7 in the rst period quickly switch
to lower numbers in period 2, as Figure 1a shows. (The same is true for players who
chose strategy 3, but this cannot be seen in Figure 1a.) Reinforcement learning cannot
predict how quickly this convergence occurs. Since the initial medians are 4-5, choices
of 3 or 7 earn between $.55 and $.95, while ex-post best responses earn $1.00 to $1.10.
Since the initial choices are positively reinforced, reinforcement learning cannot explain
why subjects will abandon these strategies so quickly and switch in the direction of
the observed median. (EWA explains convergence with a high estimate of
^
 = :85.)
Since choice reinforcement does not adjust chosen strategies quickly enough, to maximize
overall t it assumes the initial frequencies are close to frequencies in later periods,
underpredicting choices of 3 and 7 (and overpredicting 4-5).
||||||||||||||
[Figures 1a-d about here]
||||||||||||||
Figure 1c shows that the belief model underpredicts 3 and 7 also, but for a dierent
reason. In the belief-based framework it is hard to explain why players would play 6 less
than the play 5 or 7. The problem is that initial beliefs which give a high expected payo
to 4-5 (expecting a median of 4-5) also give an expected payo to 6 which is nearly as
large, and larger than the expected payo to 7. Beliefs which give a large expected payo
to 7, because there is large belief on a median of 7, will also give a high expected payo to
6. Thus, it is dicult to nd a single set of beliefs which can explain the spikes at 4-5 and
7, without also predicting a spike at 6. As a result, Table 5 shows that the one-segment
model generates initial expected payos which are higher for 6 ($.78) than for 3 or 7
($.71 and $.60), so it overpredicts 6 and underpredicts 3 and 7 (and also overpredicts 5).
Adding a second segment of players improves the belief-model t dramatically. As
Table 5 shows, the log likelihood improves a lot (the 
2
statistics for the two-segment
results compare one- and two-segment ts within each model). The two belief-model
segments correspond naturally to a large (78%) segment with high expected payos for
4-5 generated by high initial beliefs in 4-5, and a smaller (22%) segment with belief only
24
in 7, which generates the highest expected payo for 7. While testing the restriction that
the second segment does not improve t rejects strongly (
2
= 119:0), the two-segment
belief model still does not t as well as the one- or two-segment EWA model.
Besides tting initial conditions, a good learning model must explain why convergence
in the rst couple of periods is fast and sharp. EWA does this by estimating a large value
of  (.85) and
^
 much larger than ^, which allows attractions to grow rapidly so that
choice probabilities move toward zero and one swiftly. The low value of N(0), .65, also
allows players to learn quickly from payo reinforcement relative to initial attractions.
The estimates show how EWA mixes and matches the best features of belief and
reinforcement learning: It allows near-best response because  is close to one as in belief
models, explaining why players choosing near-equilibrium strategies move quickly toward
equilibrium. But as in reinforcement, it can allow arbitrary initial attractions, which
explains the relative paucity of choices of 6 in the rst period, and allows attractions to
grow (because  = 0) to explain the sharpness of convergence. As a result, the EWA
errors (Figure 1b) are generally much smaller than those in reinforcement (Figure 1c)
and belief learning (Figure 1d).
The results shown in the error plots are for one-segment models. Adding a second
segment does improve ts signicantly for all three models. In EWA, the main dierence
in segments is that the larger segment (with frequency 66%) has an estimate
^
 = :95,
very close to the belief restriction of one, while the smaller second segment has
^
 = :50.
This corresponds to a segment of people with belief-type equal weighting of actual and
foregone payos, and another segment who weight actual payos twice as heavily. Notice
that these two segments do not particularly correspond to one segment of reinforcement
learners and another segment of belief learners, so EWA is not simply capturing a mixture
of these two special cases.
In reinforcement, the larger segment (80%) has parameter values which are similar to
those in the single segment, except the estimates of initial attractions for 3 and 7 are zero.
The smaller second segment (20%) is the opposite{ strategies 3 and 7 have the largest
possible initial attractions and all the others are close to zero{ except that
^
 = 0.
29
This means the two-segment structure is trying to solve the problem of explaining rst-
period choices of 3 and 7 which are quickly extinguished by creating a second segment of
players who choose only 3 or 7 initially, then immediately decay their initial attraction.
But adding this segment does not improve log likelihood much and the two-segment
reinforcement model still ts worse than the one-segment EWA model.
The two-segment belief model improves t substantially, as noted above, but it still
does not capture initial attractions exibly enough (compared to EWA). We think the
problem is that the belief model, as we dene it, requires initial behavior to be consistent
29
The estimate of zero for  is the full-sample MLE estimate. The jackknifed standard error of .235
means that in many jackknife samples  is estimated to be positive. Indeed, the mean of the jackknife
estimates is .18, but this does not substantially aect the point we make in the text.
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with prior beliefs and requires beliefs to be updated using weighted ctitious play. The
latter assumption boils down to  = 1 and  = . In games like the median-action
game, the  = 1 assumption may be reasonable but  =  does not allow sharp enough
convergence.
30
More importantly, forcing initial attractions to spring from expected
payos does not exibly explain behavior of players who decision rules. For example,
a player who randomizes among dierent selection principles will not necessarily choose
according to expected payos given a prior.
5.4 Dominance-solvable p-beauty contest games
In a p-beauty contest game, n players simultaneously choose numbers x
i
in some interval,
say [0,100]. The average of their numbers x =
P
n
i
x
i
n
is computed, which establishes a
target number,  , equal to p  x. The player whose number is closest to the target wins
a xed prize n   (and ties are broken randomly
31
).
P -beauty contest games were rst studied experimentally by Nagel (1995) and ex-
tended by Ho, Camerer and Weigelt (in press) and Duy and Nagel (in press). These
games are useful for estimating the number of steps of iterated dominance players use
in reasoning through games. To illustrate, suppose p = :7. Since the target can never
be above 70, any number choice above 70 is stochastically dominated by simply picking
70. Similarly, players who obey dominance, and believe others do too, will pick numbers
below 49 so choices in the interval (49,100] violate the conjunction of dominance and one
step of iterated dominance. The unique Nash equilibrium is 0.
There are two behavioral regularities in beauty contest games (see Nagel, in press,
for a review). First, initial choices are widely dispersed and centered somewhere between
the interval midpoint and the equilibrium. This basic result has been replicated with
students on three continents and with several samples of sophisticated adults, including
economics Ph.D.'s and a sample of CEOs and corporate presidents (see Camerer, 1997).
Second, when the game is repeated, numbers gradually converge toward the equilibrium.
Explaining beauty contest convergence is a challenge for adaptive learning models.
Standard choice reinforcement are likely to converge far too slowly, because only one
player wins each period and the losers get no reinforcement. Belief models with low
values of , which update beliefs very quickly, may track the learning process reasonably
well, but earlier work suggests Cournot dynamics do not converge fast enough either (Ho
et al, in press).
The three models were estimated on a subsample of data collected by Ho et. al (in
30
The fact that ^ = 0 in EWA (and never varies across the jackknife runs) also suggests that adding
more segments to the belief model will not improve t substantially compared to EWA models with the
same number of segments, because the belief models are always constrained to have  = .
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Formally, (x
i
; x
 i
) =
nI(x
i
;argmin
x
j
jx
j
  j)
P
i
I(x
i
;argmin
x
j
jx
j
  j)
where I(x; y) is the indicator function that equals one
if x = y and 0 otherwise.
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press). Subjects were 196 undergraduate students in computer science and engineering
in Singapore. Each seven-person group of players played 10 times together twice, with
dierent values of p in the two 10-period sequences. (One sequence used p > 1 and is not
included below.) The prize was .5 Singapore dollars per player each time, about $2.33
per group for seven-person groups. They were publicly told the target number  and
privately told their own payo (i.e., whether they were closest or not).
We analyze a subsample of their data with p = :7 and :9, from groups of size 7. This
subsample combines groups in a `high experience' condition (the game is the second one
subjects play, following a game with a value of p > 1) and the `low experience' condition
(the game is the rst they play). The experience conditions were pooled to create enough
data to get reliable estimates.
Several design choices were necessary to implement the model. The subjects chose
integers in the interval [0,100], a total of 101 strategies. If we allow 101 possible values
of A
j
(0) we quickly use too many degrees of freedom estimating the initial attractions.
Rather than imposing too many structural requirements on the distribution of A
j
(0), we
assumed initial attractions were equal in ten-number intervals [0,9], [10, 19], etc.
32
To implement EWA we assumed subjects knew the winning number, w = argmin
x
j
[jx
j
 
 j], and neglect the eect of their own choice on the target number.
33
Dene the dis-
tance between the winning number and the target number as d = j   wj. All subjects
reinforced numbers in the intervals (   d;  + d) by  times the prize, and numbers in
the intervals [0;   d) and ( +d; 100] received no reinforcement. Winners reinforced the
boundary number they chose, either    d or  + d, by the prize divided by the number
of winners, and reinforced the other boundary number by  times the prize divided by
the number of winners. Losers reinforced both boundary numbers    d and  + d by 
times the prize, divided by the number of winners plus one.
Implementing the belief model is not straightforward because subjects were told only
the target number, and whether they won, so they do not have enough information to
form beliefs about what other subjects will do, and use these updated beliefs to calcu-
late expected payos. Reinforcing numbers in some intervals, as in the EWA updating,
will not necessarily correspond to belief learning based in information about all others'
numbers (which they do not know anyway). As a result, we estimate a restricted form
of EWA with belief-type parameters by setting  = 1,  = , estimating initial belief
counts in the ten-number intervals, and taking initial expected payos to be normalized
belief counts multiplied by the prize. Numbers in the winning interval (   d;  + d) are
32
In our working paper we assumed the distribution of the values ofA
j
(0) came from a beta distribution
but the basic results were not much dierent. We also tried tting asymmetric triangular distributions,
in which A
100
(0) = 0, A
50
(0) = c, A
0
(0) = b, and A
j
(0) was piecewise linear between 0 and 50, and 50
and 100, with slopes (c   b)=50 and  c=50, respectively, and tried normal distributions but the basic
results were unchanged.
33
Since subjects were not told the winning number (unless their number won), the fact that we must
assume they do to estimate the model could be considered a handicap for the EWA and belief-based
models, and a possible advantage for choice reinforcement, which does not require this assumption.
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reinforced by one times the prize. This corresponds to a special kind of belief learning
in which players are learning what the target number will be and best-responding given
their beliefs.
Table 1 reports overall results. Generally the t is not very impressive; 
2
values are
only around 7%. In the calibration sample, EWA is slightly better than reinforcement,
which is better than the belief model. Out of sample, the belief model and EWA model
are about equally good (and reinforcement is clearly worst); the belief model is slightly
better on MSD and much worse in log likelihood than EWA.
Table 6 reports results of parameter estimates.
||||||||||||||
[Table 6 about here]
||||||||||||||
The EWA model seems to be tting the data as best it can in an odd way: It assumes
there is a general tendency to pick lower numbers which grows stronger over time. This
can be seen in the initial attractions, which are largest for the lowest number intervals
34
,
even though the rst-period choices are clustered around 40-49 (i.e., attraction category
A
5
(0)). Then the model assumes these initial attractions `inate' over time (
^
 = 1:33).
The model is not capturing learning from experience well because lagged attractions are
weighted heavily compared to payo reinforcement (
^
N(0) is 16.82), and the estimate
^

is small (.23).
Choice reinforcement uses the same ingredients{ high initial attractions for lower
numbers, inated by
^
 = 1:38{ but ts substantially worse because N(0) is forced to be
one and there is little reinforcement from direct payos (since most players lose and get
nothing). The belief model, in contrast, ts best by assuming initial expected payos are
highest for choices in the interval [40,49], responding to payo experience strongly ( is
xed at one), and decaying attractions fairly quickly (
^
N(0) = 1:67 and
^
 = :40).
The two-segment analysis of EWA improves calibration substantially, compared to the
one-segment model, and improves on the validation log-likelihood modestly. The two-
segment reinforcement and belief models add very little to t, especially in validation.
The two EWA segments that emerge (not reported in Table 6) are interesting. The
larger segment (66%) is very much like the one-segment EWA estimate: Estimated initial
attractions increase for smaller-number intervals,
^
 is 1.61,
^
 is zero, and the experience
weight
^
N(0) is 16.83. The smaller segment (34%) is remarkably like the one-segment
belief model estimate: Initial attractions are highest for choices in the middle interval
[50,59],
^
 and ^ are small and very close (.50 and .43),
^
 is estimated to be 1.0, and
^
N(0) = 1:76.
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The exception is that attractions are high for the interval [90,100]. This is to account for the
occasional outlying choices of 100, which are discussed at length in Ho et al (in press).
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None of these models capture the nature of learning well. The reinforcement and
one-segment EWA models simply pretend that the rst period is like later periods and
inate initial attractions to gradually reproduce the latter-period data. Belief models
converge too slowly. The problem is that all these models are adaptive, so they only
use information about previous payos (including previous foregone payos). Adaptive
models of this sort cannot account for learning when players sophisticatedly realize that
other players are learning as well (cf. Milgrom and Roberts, 1991). Our earlier work
(Ho et al, in press) showed that a fraction of players seem to `iteratively best-respond'
in the sense that they choose numbers which are not best responses to observed history
(as in weighted ctitious play), but instead choose numbers which are best responses to
anticipated best-responding by others. Because the belief and reinforcement models do
not have this kind of sophistication, the hybrid EWA does not either. The main lesson
from tting the beauty-contest data is that more work is left to be done, by including
sophistication in some parsimonious way.
5.5 Identication of parameters and model diagnostics
The results generally show that EWA ts better than either of the special cases, both
adjusting for extra parameters and predicting out of sample. A further test for model
specication is to ask whether there are regular corelations among the three added param-
eters, , N(0), and , and other parameters. Because the EWA model is highly nonlinear,
it is possible that certain parameters covary so closely that it is dicult to identify them
econometrically. (By denition, a nonidentied parameter could be dropped from the
model without reducing t.) It is easy to show algebraically that the parameters are
identied, in the sense that for arbitrary data sets and MLE parameter estimates, no
other vector of parameter values which t equally well. However, it is possible that
parameters are nearly non-identied in some data sets.
An easy way to check the severity of nonidentiability is to compute correlations
among parameter estimates across jackknife runs. Two parameters which cannot be
disentangled will be perfectly correlated across runs. Low or modest correlations across
runs indicate that parameters have detectably separate inuences. By inspecting the
intercorrelations of the three important added parameters we can check whether each
parameter contributes to predictive power.
A good overall statistic is the mean absolute correlation of the estimates of a parame-
ter with all the other parameters with which it might be misidentied. We exclude initial
attractions and compute correlations among ; ; ; N(0), and .
For  the mean absolute correlation with the other parameters is .31, .39, and .23
across the constant-sum, median-action, and beauty-contest games. None of the correla-
tions with a specic parameter are consistent in magnitude and sign across games. This
indicates that  is well-identied. The same statistics for N(0) are .19, .22, and .32.
The latter number excludes the correlation between N(0) and  in the beauty-contest
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game, which is nearly one because the declining-eect constraint is binding.
35
These
gures show that N(0) is well-identied too (except when the constraint binds). The
mean absolute correlations for  are .48, .30, and .32 (the latter again excludes the high
correlation with N(0)). These correlations are somewhat higher than for  and N(0),
especially in constant-sum games, indicating possible identication problems. The most
systematic large correlation is between  and , which have an average correlation of
.88 in the constant-sum games, (and the correlations are nearly equal in all four games).
They are also correlated .50 in the median-action game and uncorrelated (-.03) in the
beauty contest game. This pattern of correlations is a hint that the two depreciation
parameters may be fundamentally related, in some games, in a way we hope to explore
in further research.
The fact that the intercorrelations among estimates are modest and unsystematic
(with noted exceptions) conrm that the parameters added in EWA contribute separately
to its t. We can also ask whether adding these parameters helps solve identication
problems which arise in the belief and reinforcement special cases. For the reinforcement
model,  and  are correlated -.79, -.68, and .05 in the three classes of games. The large
negative correlations arise because when  is lower attractions decay more rapidly, so 
must be larger to magnify small dierences in attractions into large dierences in choice
probabilities. (The same eect does not seem to happen across runs of the beauty-contest
game, where
^
 is 1.38 and none of the models captures learning well.) Therefore, it is
dicult to identify separate inuences of the two parameters. Adding  and N(0) in the
EWA model reduces the correlations between  and  in magnitude, to .15, -.40, and
-.20, eliminating any possible identication problem.
In the belief model the only apparent identication problem is between N(0) and ,
which are correlated .20, -.86 and .99 in the three games. When  is included in the
EWA model, these correlations become .23, .31, and .99, so the identication problem is
partly eliminated.
Overall, there are modest identication problems in all three models. Problems in
the reinforcement and belief models are largely alleviated by introducing , N(0), and
 in EWA. These new parameters are fairly well identied, except for modest-to-strong
correlation between  and  in two of three games. EWA therefore solves minor iden-
tication problems in the simpler models at the expense of creating another minor one,
which could be explored in further research.
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When the declining-eect constraint N(0) 
1
1 
is binding N(0) and  are not identied separately.
(The same is true in the belief model.) We regard this as a shred of evidence about the way in which
parameters may vary systematically across classes of games (see Cheung and Friedman, 1997). It may
be that dominance-solvable games in which observed strategy choices are constantly shifting location
have this general property so the restriction N(0) =
1
1 
can be safely imposed.
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6 Discussion and conclusion
We proposed a general `experience-weighted attraction' (EWA) learning model in which
the probability of choosing a strategy is determined by its relative attraction. A strategy's
attractions are updated by weighting lagged attractions by the number of periods of
`experience-equivalence' they contain, adding the payos actually received or a fraction
of the payos that would have been received, then normalizing by an experience weight.
We see the paper as making two basic contributions.
First, we show that belief learning is not fundamentally dierent from reinforcement
learning; both are special examples of one general learning rule{ EWA. By showing
their common basis, EWA lays bare the essential components of reinforcement and belief
learning, and shows how those components can be combined to make a better model.
Comparing choice reinforcement to EWA makes it clear that reinforcement assumes
players ignore foregone payos, and attractions cumulate as quickly as possible. Com-
paring weighted ctitious play to EWA makes it clear that belief models assume initial
attractions are consistent with prior beliefs, foregone and actual payos are equally re-
inforcing, and attractions are weighted averages of past attractions and payos.
Second, by estimating the more general EWA model, along with reinforcement and
belief-learning restrictions, our study combines methodological strengths of earlier studies
while avoiding weaknesses. All earlier studies did one or more of the following: Concen-
trated on only one or two models, focussed on one class of games, ignored player het-
erogeneity, restricted the generality of models, derived parameter values using methods
which do not guarantee best-ts, or did not report inferential statistics testing relative t.
Our paper had none of these limits because we compared three general models, on three
classes of games, allowed some heterogeneity, derived parameter values optimally, and
reported both test statistics (adjusting for free parameters three ways) and out-of-sample
predictive accuracy.
EWA ts better than the reinforcement models in all cases, and better than beliefs
in most cases, both adjusting for degrees of freedom within-sample and in out-of-sample
prediction. Belief models are more accurate than reinforcement in some games, and by
some measures, and less accurate in others.
Because reinforcement and belief approaches place clear restrictions on parameter
values, it is useful to describe specic ndings by parameter estimates.
The foregone payo weight  is estimated to be .42 (averaging across the four constant-
sum games) .85 in median-action games, and .23 in beauty contests. The raw average
of these numbers, .50, suggests that players generally weight foregone payos about
half as much as actual payos. This result incorporates the intuitions underlying both
reinforcement (actual payos are stronger) and belief learning (foregone payos matter).
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Put dierently, players seem to obey both the law of actual eect and a corollary law of
simulated eect.
In the three games, the decay parameters  and  average 1.00 and .94, .80 and 0,
and 1.33 and .94. The rst two games indicate that sometimes attractions seem to be
approximately averages (as in belief models) and other times they seem to cumulate as
rapidly as possible (as in reinforcement). The value of  above one in beauty contests, as
discussed above, reects a likely misspecication because the adaptive EWA model does
not incorporate sophistication and hence learns too slowly (a shortcoming the belief and
reinforcement models also share).
The initial experience weight N(0) averages 15.80, .65 and 16.82. The large values
in constant-sum and beauty-contest games imply that players learn slowly, because they
give much more weight to lagged attractions than to payos. The low value of .65 in
median-action games means players respond more strongly to payos, learning faster.
EWA also exploits the exibility of initial attractions shared by reinforcement models,
compared to belief models in which initial attractions must be expected payos based on
some prior. This exibility is particularly helpful in the coordination games.
The results show how EWA is able to `gene-splice' the best features of belief and rein-
forcement learning while avoiding weaknesses. For example, in the median-action games
players begin with dispersed choices that seem to reect dierent selection principles,
and converge quickly. Explaining this pattern well requires initial attractions which are
exible and cumulate (as in reinforcement), rather than belief-based initial attractions
which are averages, but also requires players to respond strongly to foregone payos (as
in belief learning).
The fact that parameter values vary widely across the data sets is not too surprising;
other studies have found dierences in parameter estimates across games (e.g., Chen and
Tang, 1996; Erev and Roth, 1997). Furthermore, the parameters capture dierent fea-
tures of the data{ speed of learning and sharpness of convergence. Since these features
are dierent across the games we consider, parameter values should dier. Nonethe-
less, our understanding of learning will not be complete until there is a theory of how
parameter values depend on game structure and experimental conditions (see Cheung
and Friedman, 1997, for important progress). These estimates, and others', provide raw
material for such theorizing.
6.1 EWA extensions
There are many directions for future research.
Theorizing about the kinds of equilibria EWA learning rules converge to would be
extremely useful. Progress might be made by restricting attention to special classes of
EWA players (e.g., those with  equal to zero, or one) in specic classes of games.
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An empirical direction for further research is measurement of model parameters using
psychological methods. For example, if  is interpreted as attention to foregone payos
from unchosen alternatives, then values of  should correlate with direct measures of
attention, such as the amount of time subject spend looking at dierent numbers in a
payo matrix (see Camerer et al, 1993). (In general, measuring attention to information
provides a direct way to test theories which assume certain kinds of information are not
used.
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) Or if N(0) is the number of pregame `trials' a player simulates which form prior
beliefs, then N(0) should be related to the ratio of initial response times to later-period
response times.
EWA will also have to be upgraded to cope with three modelling challenges{ sophisti-
cation, imperfect payo information, and specication of strategies{ before it is generally
applicable.
Incorporating sophistication is important because EWA players only use information
about their opponents' past choices, ignoring information about payos of others. Using
this information in an expanded learning rule which incorporates sophistication could help
explain data like those from the beauty-contest games. Iterating sophistication might also
link sophisticated-EWA to equilibrium theories like quantal-response equilibrium.
Incorporating imperfect payo information is important because any general model
should be able to explain learning in low-information environments, where players do
not know everything about their own payos, opponents' strategies, etc. EWA can
obviously be applied in these settings by xing  = 0 (which means EWA can apply to
any environment choice reinforcement applies to). A more general approach would use
imperfect information in some other way, rather than just giving it zero weight.
Incorporating a richer specication of strategies is important because stage-game
strategies are not always the most natural candidates for the strategies which players
learn about. For example, players may learn about history-dependent repeated-game
strategies or a wide variety of decision rules (like minimax, Nash equilibrium, or imitation;
e.g., Stahl, 1997). Once a set of richer strategies is specied, of course, EWA can still
model learning about those strategies. The open question, therefore, is what rules to
specify a priori, and how a model can winnow down a very large set of possible rules as
quickly as humans probably do.
Adding these dicult extensions to EWA, and a theory of rst-period play to supply
initial attractions, might eventually create a unied way to predict how people play games
in the lab and, eventually, how they play outside as well.
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For example, choice reinforcement predicts that players do not use information other than their own
payo history. Experiments which vary the information subjects are given have shown this prediction is
wrong (Mookerjhee and Sopher, 1994; cf. Van Huyck, Battalio and Rankin, 1996). Direct measures of
attention provide a more direct test: if players look at foregone payos frequently, then reinforcement
models have some explaining to do. Similarly, all adaptive models predict that players do not use
information about others' payos; looking at those payos is evidence of sophistication.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
The EWA model rules are:
(e-1) Choose A
j
i
(0) for all i, j.
(e-2) Choose N(0)  0 for all i.
(e-3) Set A
j
i
(t) for t  1 according to:
A
j
i
(t) =
  A
j
i
(t  1) N(t  1) + [ + (1  )  I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))]  (s
i
(t); s
 i
(t))
N(t)
(16)
(e-4) Set N(t) for t  1 according to:
N(t) = 1 +  N(t  1) (17)
The belief-model rules are:
(b-1) Choose initial `observation-equivalents' N
k
 i
(0)  0 for all opponents  i, strategies
k. Dene N(0) =
P
m
 i
k=1
N
k
 i
(0). Dene prior beliefs by B
k
 i
(0) =
N
k
 i
(0)
N(0)
.
(b-2) Dene N(t) = 1 +  N(t  1) for t  1. Update beliefs according to
B
k
 i
(t) =
I(s
k
 i
; s
 i
(t)) +  N
k
 i
(t  1)
N(t)
(18)
or
B
k
 i
(t) =
 B
k
 i
(t  1) +
I(s
k
 i
;s
 i
(t))
N(t 1)
N(t)
N(t 1)
(19)
(b-3) Dene attraction by expected payo,
E
j
i
(t) =
m
 i
X
k=1
B
k
 i
(t)  (s
j
i
; s
k
 i
) (20)
(i) Rule (e-1) is satised by initial attraction A
j
i
(0) induced by initial beliefs B(0)
given by (b-1) and the expected payo rule (b-3).
(ii) Rules (e-2) and (e-4) are satised by (b-1) and (b-2).
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(iii) The key step is showing that the belief-updating rule (b-2) and expected-payo
rule (b-3) for determining attraction are consistent with (e-3).
Assume  =  and  = 1. Then the EWA rule (e-3) rule becomes
A
j
i
(t) =
  A
j
i
(t  1) N(t  1) + (s
i
(t); s
 i
(t))
1 +  N(t  1)
: (21)
Suppose attraction is expected payo, so substituting (b-3) into the restricted form of
updating rule gives
A
j
i
(t) =
 
P
m
 i
k=1
B
k
 i
(t  1)  (s
j
i
; s
k
 i
) N(t  1) + (s
i
(t); s
 i
(t))
1 +  N(t  1)
(22)
Note that B
k
 i
(t   1)  N(t   1) = N
k
 i
(t   1). Then the payo terms in the numerator
may be collected to write
A
j
i
(t) =
P
m
 i
k=1
[ N
k
 i
(t  1) + I(s
k
 i
; s
 i
(t))]  (s
j
i
; s
k
 i
)
1 +  N(t  1)
(23)
or
A
j
i
(t) =
m
 i
X
k=1
(s
j
i
; s
k
 i
) 
 N
k
 i
(t  1) + I(s
k
 i
; s
 i
(t))
1 +  N(t  1)
: (24)
By the belief updating rule (b-2), this is simply
A
j
i
(t) =
m
 i
X
k=1
(s
j
i
; s
k
 i
) B
k
 i
(t) = E
j
i
(t) (25)
Hence, the updated attractions are expected payos given updated beliefs. QED
Proof of Proposition 2.
The choice reinforcement rules are:
(c-1) Choose R
j
i
(0) for all i, j.
(c-2) Set R
j
i
(t) for t  1 according to:
R
j
i
(t) =  R
j
i
(t  1) + I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))  (s
j
i
; s
 i
(t)) (26)
The proof works by substitution and algebra.
(i) Condition (c-1) follows from (e-1).
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(ii) Assume N(0) = 1 and  = 0. Then by (e-4), N(t) = 1 for all t  1.
(iii) Assume  = 0. With (ii), condition (e-3) then becomes condition (c-2):
A
j
i
(t) =   A
j
i
(t  1) + I(s
j
i
; s
i
(t))  (s
i
(t); s
 i
(t)) (27)
Hence, all three conditions (c-1) to (c-3) follow, so under these conditions A
j
i
(t) =
R
j
i
(t). QED
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